The radicalisation puzzle

This week I have not been able to stop thinking about an article I read called "The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism." Examining homegrown Islamic terrorism in Europe, the article from Hafez and Mullins synthesises the pieces of the puzzle that lead people (mostly young men, but increasingly women) toward radicalisation.

Hafez and Mullins argue that we cannot see radicalisation as a 'process'. Much of the literature around radicalisation sees it through this lens, attempting to find the 'steps' that people go through in order to become radicalised. This, approach, they argue "implies an orderly sequence of steps or procedures that produce an output." Instead, they argue:

"the absence of a clear pattern or pathway to radicalization is precisely what is frustrating scholars and intelligence analysts alike. Reality is far too complex for a single, parsimonious explanation -- and certainly not one that could yield predictive power to help identify budding radicals on the path to violent extremism."

Hafez and Mullins attempt to replace the 'process' approach to instead argue that we should look at radicalization like a puzzle. There are multiple pieces that need to add together to create the full picture, but these pieces can be assembled in multiple different ways.

Hafez and Mullins identify four pieces of the puzzle that are essential to Islamic radicalization: grievances, networks, ideology and enabling environments and support structures. Let's cover each briefly.

Hafez and Mullins identify a range of grievances that occur within Muslim communities in Europe, including systemic racism, the exclusion from notions of nationhood and citizenship, economic discrimination, negative media portrayals etc. All of these issues have formented (and rightfully so) a range of grievances within Muslim communities, ones that create a basis for radicalisation.

These grievances however are not enough. As Hafez and Mullins point out there are millions of Muslims living in Europe, all of which experience these issues to some extent. Yet only a tiny fraction of them radicalise, and even a smaller fraction turn this radicalisation into violence. As they argue "in keeping with the puzzle metaphor, we view these grievances as the landscape that frames the proximate causes of radicalization, but we do not find compelling any argument that suggests thay they are directly causal of behavioural radicalization." There has to be more.

Secondly therefore, Hafez and Mullins argue that networks are essential to radicalization. The literature, they argue, consistently finds that preexisting friendship and kinship ties are essential to recruitment for a range of activities --  political participation, social activism, gangs, cult membership, terrorism and extremism. As they argue:

"Individuals that join violent groups often do so because they have one or more family members or friends in the movement. Radicalization and recruitment are local and highly personal tasks involving interpersonal ties, bonds of solidarity, and trust."

This is an important challenge to much of the literature that exists around the web and lone wolves in particular, which argues that people are increasingly radicalising on their own, often through absorbing radical information online. While Haffez and Mullins argue that self-radicalization is definitely a thing (and there are clear examples of this occurring, particularly in the far right), they argue that, at least in the case of Islamic terrorism in Europe that networks are still an essential piece of the puzzle. People are recruited through friends and family, and these networks then form essential bonds that can facilitate violent and extremist attacks.

Third, Haffez and Mullins argue that ideological narratives are almost always present in the creation of violent extremists. "Radical movements rooted in political ideologies usually identify a problematic social condition, attribute a cause to this state of affairs, and propose a course of action in the form of progreammatic steps or stages necessary for transformation." Effective ideologies take the grievances felt by communities and create a world view from that. This world view includes the identification of a group who has caused the problems, and the articulation of solutions to those problems (which usually invovles some form of radical action). In doing so Haffez and Mullins argue that ideology has a range of functions: it creates new ways for people to see the world, it diminishes the sense of fatalism many isolated individuals have by convincing them that the status quo is problematic and that the fault lies with external forces and it invokes a sense of moral outrage by labeling the status quo as unjust, exploitative, oppressive or heretical. Ideology in turn helps form a rebellious identity within networks, ones which act to react against this status quo.

Finally, Haffez and Mullins argue that radicalization requires enabling environments and support structures. These enabling environment and support structures are varied and can include the Internet, social media, or access to foreign terrorist training camps. These spaces "advance radicalization by providing ideological and material support for suscpetible individuals." As they argue for example:

"The birth of Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization with affiliates from North Africa to South Asia have created terrorist training camps where radicalized individuals could deepen their ideological socialization free from the watchgul eyes of security services, and develop military skills with the help of seasoned verterans of earlier jihads."

This piece of the puzzle is essential, particularly when it comes to violent and terrorist acts. Again, Haffez and Mullins argue that while there is evidence of individuals self-radicalising and undertaking violent acts on their own, in the majority of cases an enabling environment and support structure is required. This does not have to be a physical group like a terrorist training camp, and it can occur online. But for users to take the next step they frequently require that support structure behind them.

What are the implications of this work?

I think the puzzle metaphor is a strong one to understanding radicalization, and not just in the case of Islamic terrorism. While Haffez and Mullins focus on homegrown Islamic terrorism in Europe, this metaphor could easily be adapted to explain far right extremism, online extremism, misogynystic groups etc. The individual pieces of the puzzle may change, but that radicalization occurs due to a range of complex factors does not. Radicalisation rarely, if ever, happens simply due to one factor, and the puzzle metaphor allows us to explore these different complex factors together. Importantly, I think this allows us to understand more deeply how violence occurs within radicalised communities. As Haffez and Mullins rightfully argue most people who become radicalized do not act on this radicalization in violent ways. Of the small percentage of Muslims in Europe who become radicalized even a smaller percentage become violent. This is clearly true in other groups as well. While there are hundreds of thousands of people in online MRA and anti-feminist communities, only a tiny percentage of these men undertake violent acts. What is the piece of the puzzle therefore that allows people to take that next step? The puzzle metaphor allows us to articulate and investigate this more clearly, rather than simply seeing everyone who is radicalized being on a ladder toward violent acts.

I think we could extend this even further, looking at acts such as domestic abuse. The pieces of the puzzle around domestic abuse would be very different than that of Islamic terrorism. Most of the time, for example, domestic abusers would not have a network of other abusers where they coordinate their work. Their violence is unlikely to be part of a clearly articulated ideology. But, at the same time, we also know that domestic abuse is not the outcome of a clearly defined process that is driven solely by one or two factors (i.e. toxic masculinity or economic circumstance). Different pieces come together in different ways to form a complex puzzle. It is through identifying these pieces of the puzzle that we have the best chance to intervene and stop it from occuring.

The puzzle metaphor is therefore a very useful one, and it is one I hope to use in my own research around misogynistic communities online. I think it is an approach that would be really valuable to use when thinking about how we address a range of different forms of violence and extremism in our communities.